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Abstract 
Six years have gone by since the political upheaval that swept through many Middle East and North 
African (MENA) countries begun. Syria was caught in the grip of this revolutionary moment, one 
that drove the country from a peaceful popular mobilisation to a deadly fratricide civil war with no 
apparent way out. This paper provides an alternative approach to the study of the root causes of the 
Syrian uprising by examining the impact that the development of new media had in reconstructing 
forms of collective action and social mobilisation in pre-revolutionary Syria. By providing evidence 
of a number of significant initiatives, campaigns and acts of contentious politics that occurred 
between 2000 and 2011, this paper shows how, prior to 2011, scholarly work on Syria has not given 
sufficient theoretical and empirical consideration to the development of expressions of dissent and 
resilience of its cyberspace and to the informal and hybrid civic engagement they produced.  
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apparent way out. Scholars advanced a number of explanations for this event, which included the 
demographic profile of the younger generations and the economic recession they experienced, rising 
wealth concentration, high unemployment, the use of techniques from successful campaigns and the 
coordination of dissent through traditional/offline and new/online forms of contention. The 
employment of the new media has often been framed as a deus ex-machina of the uprising, a Silicon 
Valley product that came to liberate citizens from the grip of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, did 
Syrians truly acquire the ability to use the new media technologies at the eve of the uprising or did 
they slowly mastered their ability through a period of maturation and gestation? How does the 
epistemic community explain the extensive reliance that Syrian protestors made of the new media at 
the time of the uprising, when the country was depicted as falling behind international and regional 
standards of media development?1  Is the error in the statistics or is it in the bigger picture?2 Could 
one argue that Syria watchers have miscalculated the contingent and nonlinear impact of digital media 
and technologies on Syria’s civil society from an empirical as well as theoretical point of view? 
For the new media to act as “liberating tools” (liberating in the sense of opposing authoritarian and 
non-democratic regimes) is it necessary to have the whole population connected online? Or could it 
be the exact opposite? If one looks at the West where the new technologies have been used for a 
longer time and where the majority of population has access to them, one would expect citizens to be 
politically and civically more aware and participative. Yet, this is not always the case. On the contrary, 
the amount of (dis)information and people’s unregulated access to the web is actually producing the 
exact opposite: distraction and fragmentation. According to Howard and Hussein, for the media to 
become powerful tools capable of generating political or social changes one does not need to have 
the whole population tuned online but only a few brokers who act as intermediaries between the 
strong, yet offline social networks and the wider digital public (Howard and Hussein, 2013:12). Is it 
possible to argue that academic interest has been oriented towards the role that the new media played 
at the time of the Arab uprising, while insufficient interest, instead has been directed to the role they 
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played in the years predating it, the period one might define as constitutive and of maturation? On 
this line, though the Syrian uprising started in 2011, is it possible to argue that digital media played 
an even more important role in the years that led to the uprising, reconstructing forms of collective 
action and social mobilisation that had not existed before in a closed regime like Syria? 
What this study does is to explain the outbreak of the Syrian uprising and the role played by digital 
media by focusing on an aspect that academic work has largely disregarded, the way new media 
became the major articulators and developers of a change in the political and social fabric of Syria 
prior to 2011. Up to the burst of Syria’s chapter of the Arab Spring, most of the studies on Syria had 
focused their attention on the strategies and techniques adopted by president Bashar al-Asad to tap 
new resources, diversify legitimacy bases and redefine state-societies relation, what Heydemann 
defined “authoritarian upgrading”, Perthes called “modernised authoritarianism” and Hinnebush 
described as “post-populist” (Heydemann 2007; Perthes 2004; Hinnebusch 2006). Only a niche of 
Syria’s scholars had examined forms of subversive practices in pre-uprising Syria that - with 
hindsight - could anticipate the weaknesses of the authoritarian upgrading argument. Within this 
group, the media had been the focus of attention of an even smaller group of scholars, like Wedeen, 
Salamandra and George who had examined various expressions of political dissent, whether in the 
press or TV series, but that were interpreted more as safety valves rather than acts of political 
resistance with long-term consequences (Wedeen 1999; Salamandra 2008; George 2003). On the 
contrary, this paper aims at contributing to the growing literature that is analyses the root causes of 
Syria’s uprising by expanding our understanding on the linkages between pre-war new media and 
wartime dissidence. In this sense, the Syrian uprising represents the eventual element of analysis, and 
the concluding state of the narrative, towards which this study is constantly projected. What emerges 
is that, if the Syrian uprising is said to have formally begun in 2011, its formation is thought to date 
back to the start of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency in 2000. The underlying argument of this paper is 
that during the decade that led to the uprising in Syria, a (silent) form of mobilisation took place as 
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an effect of opportunity structures (economic, institutional and social context), conditioned by 
people’s access to new media. If it is true that the Syrian government under Bashar al-Asad was able 
to modernise authoritarianism or to upgrade authoritarianism to the changing times, this paper holds 
that these same changes contributed to making the Syrian regime more vulnerable and exposed to the 
challenge of popular elements of dissent.3 This scenario determined the creation of loopholes or 
power vacuums that allowed alternative forces to emerge through the new spaces offered by the 
digital media. The Syrian regime slowly lost control of two elements on which its stability was based: 
control of the flow of information and surveillance of people’s interaction. The emergence of new 
media symbolised a turning point for Syria, as they directed the already existing motives for a popular 
mobilisation and offered a space to express political, cultural and social protest. The outbreak of the 
revolt in 2011 did not symbolise the start of Syria’s revolution but the shift of an existing and 
unstructured growing social mobilisation from virtual to tangible street mobilisation. 
This article elaborates a conceptual model aimed at examining the role that digital media had in the 
formation of the Syrian uprising. By locating the seeds of Syria’s uprising prior to 2011, this article 
encourages to rethink the concept of social movement and activism within the context of Syria and 
as an effect of the role that new media can play in closed regimes like the Syrian one. Limiting this 
study to a theoretical analysis supported by a number of significant empirical examples, this article 
is structured in two parts. The first part provides an overview of the context (opportunity structures) 
in which Syria’s online mobilisation is said to have emerged.  The second part instead indicates how 
the new media became the mobilising structures of Syria’s uprising. The Internet, in particular, 
became a tool that channelled the mistrust towards the regime and the hopes for reforms, as well a 
space, a virtual platform that facilitated manifestations of dissent and protests. As such, the new media 
did not simply provide the tool to spread discontent and mobilise civic engagement, they became the 
space for contention themselves, where new collective subjectivities emerged. 
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 The Virtual, and Quite, (Non)Movement of pre-Uprising Syria 
 
The conceptual framework that this study elaborates stands on two disciplines: media studies and 
social movement studies. The two disciplines have for long developed along two different tracks and 
only recently colluded their research focus. The advent of the new media has in fact had such an 
influence on the formation of modes of communication, collective identity, public sphere and 
grassroots mobilisation that media and social movement scholars find their research interests 
intersecting. In reality, the discipline of social movement studies has always taken into account the 
role of the media, even the most traditional ones, like underground newspapers, outlawed radio, tapes 
and other old-fashioned information media. However their role has never occupied a central part of 
study, as in practice the old media supported the development of a group’s mobilisation, but have 
always been considered as constitutive elements with no agency, non-leading factors. Yet all major 
events in history have been shaped by media technology since the invention of the printing press, 
from the American Revolution and the civil rights movement in the American South, to the struggles 
for independence from colonial rule and the peace movements. However today, social movements 
are influenced by the role of the media as never before.4 Digital media have revolutionised the process 
of formation and mobilisation of a social movement, which does not require people to be physically 
present in the same place, if for “place” we refer to an environment physically existing. The Internet 
may be thought as a “virtual place” or better a “space” that allows physically dispersed people to 
converge. It may converge people dislocated in different countries as well people within the same 
country, maybe only one block away from one another if contexts like that of authoritarian countries  
do not allow forms of social gathering to take place in the streets. According to Wolfson, the new 
technologies have simply “enabled new possibilities for the scale, strategy, structure, and governance 
of social movement” and allowed the grass-roots, populist activism to become global (Wolfson, 2014: 
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4).5 Perhaps more than a change in the formation of social movements, the digital space has simply 
provided a new ground for the evolution and development of activism in the digital age. 
Before assessing the role of digital media in the formation of what is here argued to have been a 
(silent) form of online mobilisation in the years leading up to Syria’s uprising, this section will analyse 
the context in which opportunity structures created the perfect “astral moment” for the emergence of 
dissent through online platforms. This study shares Oleinik’s assumption that social, institutional and 
economic contexts provide the primary conditions for social movements (otherwise called 
opportunity structures), though it asserts that it is their combination between motives for contention 
with new media (mobilising structures) that paves the way to popular mobilisation (Oleinik, 2012). 
As represented in Figure 1, the opportunity structures constitute the opportunities or constraints that 
drive the social movement, whereas the mobilising structures are the resources necessary for the 
mobilisation. The new media have become a new way of social networking and therefore a new 
catalyst tool in the formation of social movements.  
FIGURE 1 FORMATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
 
During the presidency of Bashar al-Asad the country experienced the pressures of opposing forces 
pushing towards authoritarianism, reformism and globalisation. Most research on opportunity 
structures has shown how changes in some aspects of the political system generate new possibilities 
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for collective action. The vulnerability of the political system creates the chance for others to seize 
the opportunity and push through social change. This vulnerability can be the result of many factors 
such as increasing political pluralism, decline in repression, division within elites or increased 
political enfranchisement (Cragun, R. and Cragun, D., 2008). In the case of Syria, as represented in 
Figure 2,  three major dynamics are identified as having placed the country under great friction, 
offering the opportunity structures necessarily for a popular mobilisation: pressures from below, 
coming from the people, pushing for socio-political reforms; pressures from above, coming from the 
government, which granted limited reforms and openings; and pressures from the outside, coming 
from the West, adopting the strategy of supplying development aid, in the format of media projects, 
to empower civil society organisations to the disadvantage of the state.6  As previously mentioned, 
this study contributes to the existing scholarship on Syria, situating the focus within the wider 
literature on Arab authoritarianism, Arab media and social movement theory. New media technology, 
here under scrutiny, cannot be analysed in isolation from other factors, rather feeds into the existing 
scholarship on Syria and enriches with new connectors. The aim is to understand the Syrian uprising 
of 2011 not as an inevitable yet unforeseen event, rather as the outcome of a rising civic engagement 
and digital connectivity that was emerging in the country.  
FIGURE 2 THE FORMATION OF SYRIA'S PRE-UPRISING MOBILISATION 
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Opportunity Structures 
 
Pressure from below. Since the start of the presidency of Bashar al-Asad in 2000, an informal social 
mobilisation has made inroads in the country, challenging the regime’s authority and decision 
making. “The Syrian uprising of 2011 was not, by any means, the first opposition movement under 
Bashar al-Asad” (Ghadiban, 2015: 91). As Ghadiban argues, Bashar al-Asad faced growing dissident 
activism “through rises and declines, articulating several enduring demands but ultimately failing to 
bring about the desired changes” (Ghadiban, 2015: 91). This process started at the eve of Bashar al-
Asad’s presidency, with the bursting of a lively civil society movement called the “Damascus 
Spring”, where a diversified group of people, made up of intellectuals, artists, and activists 
campaigned for a change in social, political and economic structures (George, 2003). The country 
witnessed for the first time in decades to the resurgence of public gatherings, discussion forums, 
political debates, community associations, cultural forums, women and human rights’ organisations. 
Independent gatherings (muntadayat) spread through the country with the intent of offering a platform 
for discussions on arts and culture; yet these soon turned into stages to discuss issues about politics, 
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religion and human rights (Stenberg, Salamandra, 2015: 5). Courageous political stances were taken 
by many civil society groups, like the “Statement of the 99”, drafted in September 2000, a manifesto 
signed by 99 Syrian civil society activists demanding the end of the state of emergency which had 
been in effect since 1963. Along the same lines, but much bolder in its tone was the “Manifesto of 
1000” in 2001, which repeated the earlier objectives, but also explicitly attacked the foundation of 
the Ba’ath party and advocated a multi-party political system with political and constitutional reforms 
(Sawah, 2012). In 2005, opposition figures as well as religious and secular political parties became 
signatories of the “Damascus Declaration”, which publicly criticised the government for being 
authoritarian and asking for profound reforms (Pace and Landis, 2009).7 It was the first document 
since the beginning of Ba’th rule in 1963 to receive endorsement from so many different political 
forces, like the leftists, nationalists, Kurdish parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, intellectuals and artists 
(Ghadiban, 2015). Hinnebusch and Zintl note how though unsuccessful in achieving their requests, 
these initiatives provided models of civil society mobilisation that activists would build on when the 
revolt of 2011 started (Hinnebusch and Zintl 2015).8 Despite their inability to obtain any noticeable 
change, such initiatives manifested a growing sense of political maturity in Syrian civil society and 
represented a growing force, exercising pressure on the government (Kawakibi and Kodami, 2003). 
In 2006 exiled Syrian opposition leaders established the National Salvation Front (NSF), a coalition 
meant to bring democratic regime change in Syria,  which gathered different opponents to the Syrian 
regime, namely former vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish and 
communist parties and independents (Ghadiban, 2015: 96). Syrians also plunged into a vivid cultural 
life represented by fora such as the Forum for National Dialogue and the Jamal Atassi Forum, offering 
people a place in which to express their opinions and debate the steps to produce reform (Sawah, 
2012). A number of human rights demonstrations, like those of the Syrian Human Rights Association 
and the Defence of Democratic freedoms and human rights took place in the capital.9 The regime 
hardly welcomed the emergence of a Syrian civil society movement, especially its political fringes. 
As a consequence, the movement was strongly ostracised, its members harassed and punished. 
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Despite the repressive measures adopted by the authorities, the Syrian civil society movement did not 
die with the Damascus Spring but moved underground, or rather online, abandoning drawing rooms 
and coffee shops for the virtual space of the Internet. The regime tolerated the existence of such 
mobilisation if limited to cyber space, believing that it would have been innocuous for the state’s 
stability and would have instead gained the West’s sympathy, representing the regime’s new openings 
towards pluralism and making the country seem at step with the globalised world. It is at this point 
that scholarly interest towards the thriving Syrian civil society phenomenon saw a drastic decline, 
undermining the role that its online version had had. The beginning of the new presidency of Bashar 
al-Asad coincided with the country’s access to the Internet and social media users, the spread of 
satellite dishes on the top of Syrian homes and of smart phone holders. The Internet did not just 
provide a new territory to extend old struggles with new practices, it contested a decades-long culture 
of fear and established new state-society relations (Shaery-Eisenlohr and Cavatorta, 2012). 
Pressure from above. In Syria, the new President carried out a series of reforms, which at the time 
were ridiculed for not being “reformist” enough. With the benefit of hindsight, those reforms may 
have been the stepping stone of long term effects. Some of these reforms were literally cosmetic, like 
the ones that changed the school’s uniforms from a khaki colour to a light blue for boys and pink for 
girls. The same genre of reform was the one that allowed the opening of fancy cafes and restaurants 
for the well-off of the country. Of a different type were the reforms that led to the closing of the 
infamous Mezzeh prison in Damascus; the release of political prisoners (600 only in November 
2000); the replacement of the old guard with young and western-educated ministers between 2000 
and 2005; the licensing of several private universities; the creation of a Ministry of Expatriates to 
encourage the return of Syrian migrants; the country’s access to the Internet with projects to develop 
IT literacy among the younger generations as well as also in remote areas of the country; the new 
media law (decree no. 50) which opened media outlets to private ownership (Lesch, 2005; Caldwell, 
2010).10 As it will be discussed later in this paper, the Internet played a crucial role in overcoming 
12 
 
the atomisation of society and providing the basis for a mobilisation against the regime. It is not a 
case that people’s access to the Internet and mobile phones increased from less than 1 percent in 2000 
to 21 percent in 2010 for the Internet, while mobile phone use reached 60 percent.11 Amid these 
encouraging attempts of reform, there were also discussions about the abolition of the Ba’ath Party 
in Syria, which did not lead to its actual realization, but still represented an unprecedented 
hypothesis.12 Heydemann aptly defines these reforms as “authoritarian upgrading”, indicating an 
attempt by the new president to hold onto power, and “reconfigure authoritarian governance to 
accommodate and manage changing political, economic and social conditions” (Heydemann, 2007: 
1). However, as detailed by Hinnebusch and Zintl, the economic liberalisation inaugurated by Bashar 
al-Asad and his technocrats, altered the regime’s social base, engineering a turnover on leadership 
and cadres and concentrating power in the presidency and the Asad family at large (Hinnebusch and 
Zintl, 2015: 6). Syrian regime officials referred to the ‘Chinese model’ of reform, one that improves 
living standards but for the benefits and stability of the regime. If one bears in mind De Tocqueville’s 
argument holding that the most dangerous moment for an authoritarian regime is when it attempts to 
reform itself, these reforms had potentially destabilised the status quo. In this regard, Salam Kawakabi 
observes that Bashar al-Asad’s upgrading consisted in the liberalisation of the economy, 
technological development and reliance on civil society organisations to deliver services that the state 
was not able to offer (Kawakibi 2012). One example was the establishment of a number of GONGOs 
(government-organised non-governmental organisations) under the patronage of the Syrian First 
Lady Asma al-Asad. While at first this strategy allowed the state to keep control of the new civil 
society actors, with time they widened their activities and audience away from the regime’s control. 
Therefore, the survival tactics adopted by the regime, combined with other factors, produced 
unpredicted consequences (Hinnebusch, 2012).13 
Pressure from the outside. The change in Syria was not generated only by internal factors, whether 
coming from the people or the authorities, but also by exogenous causes. An overall picture would 
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show Syria heavily affected by foreign powers’ policies and by ongoing destabilising regional events. 
On the one hand, the country opted to initiate a process of liberalisation as an effect of the economic 
and political reforms inaugurated by the government, which led to the signing of economic 
agreements with new international partners like the European Union, Turkey, Iran, China and several 
Arab countries (Scheller, 2013). On the other hand, ongoing discrepancies with the US 
administration, in particular with the Bush presidency, made Syria fall under a dark light and emerge 
in the list of the Axis of Evil. This came at a time when the country was suffering from regional 
instability caused by the second intifada (2000-2005), the dramatic event of the fall of Baghdad in 
2003 and the fear of facing a similar destiny, in addition to the exacerbating effects in the wake of the 
assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and Israeli wars against Syrian 
allies Hezbollah and Hamas. Despite these external pressures, the regime proceeded with economic 
liberalisation, moving its trade towards China, Iran, Turkey and the Greater Arab Free Trade 
Association (GAFTA) (Hinnebusch, Zintl, 2015: 14). The new investment inflows produced a boom 
in private sectors like trade, housing, banking, construction and tourism (Hinnebusch, Zintl, 2015: 
288). In this context of reforms, economic liberalisation and increasing diffusion of media technology 
Syria became the target of media assistance projects promoted by the West. As discussed by Brownlee 
in her study of Syria’s media aid architecture, the country became the target of a number of media 
development aid programs aimed on the one hand at improving the development of the media sector 
in line with Western models of independent journalism and on the other at empowering a class of 
civil society activists (Brownlee, 2017). Arguably, this strategy represented the West’s new approach 
towards Syria and other unfriendly regimes, one which aimed at destabilising them by simply 
implementing aid programmes, instead of waging an Iraq-like war. 
This scenario – which is an oversimplification – of the contextual situation in Syria under 
president Bashar al-Asad, demonstrates how a combination of factors created the opportunity 
structures necessary for people to engage through forms of social mobilisation via the channels 
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offered by the new media and in particular, the Internet. The vulnerability of the political system 
generated by opposing deviant forces caused by a regime willing to open and modernise the country 
and at the same time tighten its control and repression, all combined with an unstable political regional 
setting and the West’s investment in media and civil society actors, created the chance for new modes 
of social and political action through online platforms.  
 
Mobilising Structures 
Goodwin and Jasper argue that social movements are not created by a single factor but by a set of 
variables that interact. It is a combination of social, institutional and economic conditions – like the 
ones just described for Syria – which provide the underlying motives for social movements (Goodwin 
and Jasper, 2003). In this regard, multiple studies have demonstrated that grievances alone are not 
enough to bring people to act collectively (Buechler, 2000). In order to mobilise, people need 
organisation and resources. Opportunity structures and mobilising structures act in tandem to create 
social movements. Opportunity structures provide the motivation for movement organisations by 
materialising the political, social and economic conditions necessary for mobilisation. Mobilizing 
structures, in turn, constitute those formal and informal vehicles through which people organise and 
engage in collective action.  
Communication, one infers, is at the basis of any form of popular organisation. As Tilly holds, 
social movement theory should not place the individual as the primary unit of social movements, 
rather it should identify it in the interaction between individuals (Tilly, 1984). In fact, individuals 
have proved to have participated in collective action only when they are sure that others are 
participating (Wright, 2001). Trust and confidence in the adherence of other participants can only 
grow out of communication between individuals (Lim, 2012). Within this design, the new information 
and communication technologies have inaugurated new paths for popular movements and new 
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avenues of research for scholars. If one considers a closed regime like the one in Syria, the possibility 
for traditional media to act as mobilising structures of a popular movement had been practically 
impossible. State and media almost coincided, as traditional media were owned and jealously 
controlled by the state. With the coming of age of new information and communication technologies, 
the capabilities of the Syrian regime to control the flow of information and people’s inter-action were 
drastically reduced. This embodied a turning point in the recent political narrative, given that the 
underlying motives for a popular mobilisation already existed. People’s access to the new media in 
Syria was the vehicle and the space for social mobilisation. 
While previous social movements had generally been organised around traditional hubs like 
cafés, universities and underground reunions, with the coming of age of the new media, people found 
new ways and spaces to meet, discuss and organise, opting for a strategy more convenient in terms 
of timeframe, money and safety. This was the case in Syria, where the civil society movement born 
on the eve of Bashar al-Asad’s new presidency was crushed vehemently by the regime and was 
obliged to go underground (virtually). The movement had, somewhat naively, believed in the initial 
promises for reforms from the new president, promoting initiatives and debates on public matters in 
public spaces. However, in the course of a few months it became clear that the regime was not 
seriously committed to respecting the promises made, inaugurating a staunch witch-hunting of all 
initiatives that the regime presumed could jeopardise the state’s stability. Satellite TV and the Internet 
produced the most visible changes in terms of civil awareness and engagement. Arabic-language 
satellite television in general, and al-Jazeera in particular, became a major source of information for 
Syrians, replacing national news production. Al-Jazeera’s effect in Syria was felt not just in terms of 
news and information production, but as a platform for the Syrian civil society movement. For 
instance, at the time of the Damascus Spring in 2001, satellite television played a significant role in 
keeping Syrians updated with events, which went unreported by state-run television.14 Ghadiban 
notes how al-Jazeera infringed on all the regimes’ redlines, covering issues on democracy, human 
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rights and Islamic fundamentalism, and having extensive coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Ghadiban, 2015). This generated new understanding and motive for reflection when programmes 
like Bila Hudud (Without Limits) hosted the leader of the banned Syrian Muslim Brothers, who 
presented himself as a promoter of democracy, demanding the end of the State of Emergency law. 
Even more daring was al-Jazeera’s interview of the opposition of Monzer al-Mouseli, an independent 
member of the Syrian People’s Assembly, who opposed the constitutional amendment passed to allow 
Bashar al-Asad to run for president despite his youth (Zisser, 2006: 78). Beside established satellite 
TV station like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, other media offered Syrian opposition a place to express 
their views, like the two satellite TV stations launched by Syrian dissidents in Brussels and London, 
respectively Zanoubia and Barada TV (Ghadiban, 2015: 106). The latter, in particular, played a 
fundamental role in the years predating the uprising as an anti-regime information campaign venue, 
with shows like “Toward Change”- a panel discussion on current events-, and “First Step” – a 
programme produced by Syrian dissident groups based in the US. Syrians responsiveness to the new 
programmes offered by satellite TV channels was evident from the proliferation of satellite dishes on 
the roofs of Syrian homes as well as from the number of callers from Syria participating on live TV 
shows (Ghadiban, 2001: 81).  
Alan George compares the proliferation of satellite television and the Internet to a concrete 
nightmare for authoritarian regimes like the Syrian one (George, 2003: 134). The advent of the 
Internet produced the most thought-provoking examples of civic engagement, as it was used by the 
political opposition to circulate its bulletins and statements; to spread petitions and collect signatures 
on political and social issues; to inform the public of the regimes wrongdoings; and to publish literary 
works that had been censored by the state. Numerous news websites served as online windows to 
discuss topics like drug consumption, homosexuality, female harassment, interfaith marriage, 
progressively infringing on many established taboo topics. Examples of this type of civic engagement 
are numerous but we are here going to mention only a few in order to save space for the theoretical 
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speculations. A significant case is represented by the news website All4Syria.com, one of the online 
most read bulletin, with over 15,000 daily subscribers (Kawakibi, 2010). The longevity of the website 
was constantly obstructed by the regime for its content. In fact, All4Syria offered a collection of 
articles from the national and foreign press and a ‘readers complaint section’ that took charge of 
exposing problems of corruption in the country, by directly naming those causing it. The digital space 
welcomed people from different walks of life to find their preferred communication means, whether 
through blogs, Facebook pages, news websites. All these means offered Syrians the opportunity to 
carry out crucial battles on social matters for the first time, some worthy of being mentioned. For 
instance, a university student launched a campaign on Facebook, called “We want to go forward, not 
backward”, which counted 1,339 members in March 2010 (Baiazy, 2012). The group was concerned 
with women’s rights and hosted debates on topics such as interfaith marriage, honour crimes and 
discrimination against women in Syrian law.  Rami Nakhle, a prominent Syrian activist who gained 
an international reputation only after 2011, launched two important online campaigns in 2009, the 
“Get Your Rights”, to help Syrians to circumvent Internet censorship and the “Enough Silence 
Campaign”, calling for the lifting of the Emergency Law and the release of political prisoners.15 In 
other cases, the Internet turned into a window to denounce malpractices, like the YouTube video that 
showed a police officer receiving a bribe, which was watched 366, 703 times and received 1,323 
comments (Baiazy, 2012). 
Significant is the role that the Syrian digital space played as a platform for citizens to carry 
out crucial battles on social matters and mediate new roles in relations to the state. Successful 
campaigns like the National Campaign against Honour Crimes, aimed at improving women’s rights 
in Syria and promoting citizenship and the Personal Status Law Campaign to promote civil rights, 
the national campaign to annul an amendment of martial law, the campaign for women’s right to 
confer their citizenship on their children, the campaign to lower mobile rates and the one to protect 
young women who had been victims of rape, all occurred through the Internet (Sawah, 2012).16 These 
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online campaigns were impressively well-organised, raising awareness about the implications of such 
laws, signing petitions calling for the withdrawal of the laws and presenting them to officials of the 
government. Similarly, many petitions and denunciations on a number of topics have circulated 
online. In particular, two political events have had a great success thanks to the Internet: the Damascus 
Declaration for Democratic National Change (October 2005) and the Beirut-Damascus/Damascus-
Beirut Declaration (April 2006) (Kawakibi, 2010). Both documents circulated online and collected 
large number of signatories. The importance of such initiatives was not simply that they manged to 
change laws and raise civic awareness but they showed how the Internet could become an effective 
tool for expressing political, social and cultural protests. These initiatives represented a changing 
social and political pattern in Syrian civic life, which broke the civilian stagnation that the regime had 
created and so much invested in. Moreover, the type of dialogue that emerged in the digital space 
broke with the traditional hierarchies based on an imbalance of powers and mostly deconstructed the 
fear that the regime had inculcated into citizens. All in all, the Internet became the only effective tool 
and space for expressing political, cultural and social protest. 
 
Rethinking the Notion of Social Struggle with the New Media 
 
Before the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, Syrian studies mainly covered issues of elite politics, 
foreign policy, and ethnic/identity politics. Few focused on civil society and those that did mostly 
tended to conclude that the government’s practise of promoting autonomy and transferring 
responsibilities to citizens was a tactical expedient to infiltrate society and control it (Gilbert and 
Ward, 1997). As such, most of the epistemic community - before the outbreak of uprising in 2011 - 
failed to recognise the fact that in the long term these quasi-autonomous dynamics created unintended 
consequences for the country’s political and social stability (Kawakibi, 2012). If not for the 
scholarship on Syrian musalsalat (TV series), studies on the role of new media in Syria were scant as 
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the expansion of the Internet and the new technologies was weighted with Western terms for 
comparison, therefore appearing irrelevant of study and non-effective vis-à-vis the perspective of 
social or political change. However, what this paper argues is that Syria witnessed the emergence of 
an unstructured form of civic resistance and mobilisation through the digital space in the years that 
predated the uprising. How can we define this type of mobilisation? Is it a prototype of Syria’s 
uprising of 2011? Does it classify in terms of “social movement”, understood as an organised and 
territorially based movement qualifying for Castell’s “social transformation” or Van Naerssen’s 
“emancipation” or should it opt for other definitions? (Bayat, 1997). 
If one had to adhere to the classic definition of a social movement, it would most probably 
identify the Syrian uprising of 2011 as such, and not its preliminary mobilisation. If social movements 
are classified as durable structures of collective action aimed at producing social change, then the 
Syrian pre-uprising online mobilisation was not a self-identifying movement, with structured action 
and with clear-cuts objectives. More likely, it was a form of collective action with strong elements of 
spontaneity, whose organisation focused on single-scope campaigns, and whose unwrapping was 
largely self-generated and primarily concerned with action over identity or meaning. According to 
Diani, the nature of regimes in the Middle East, which criminalises politics and imposes strategies of 
control and repression, does not allow citizens to challenge the authority through coalitions and 
movements, rather through community-based informal resistance (Diani, 2008). In this light, Syria’s 
online mobilisation can be defined as the expression of “everyday forms of resistance”, which 
however differs from Scott’s definition in that its actions are not individualistic and quiet, but 
exemplified by collective campaigns that search for visibility through the digital space and that aim 
at widening adhesions (i.e. the numerous online petitions) and visibility through online platforms. In 
a way, these campaigns may be seen as forming a “movement in itself”, a social movement per se 
only when the actors involved become conscious of their shared grievances and articulate their actions 
within a wider and long-lasting plan aimed at social transformation. This may be identified with the 
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uprising in 2011, where the anti-establishment campaigns moved from digital platforms to the streets. 
This shift from the online to the offline street protests marks the change from atomised episodic 
collective actions, limited to cyber space to “molecular” durable mass campaigns, conscious political 
acts targeting political authority. 
I argue that what Asef Bayat defines as “street politics”, the physical and social space of the 
“streets” where citizens confront the authorities, has moved from the alleyways, pavements and public 
parks of the city to the virtual alleys of the Internet (Bayat, 1997). As Fahmi holds, the new 
information technologies have created new “geographies of protest”, “shifting their [activists’] 
campaigns and resources to alternative virtual venues” (Fahmi, 2008). Citizens now have the chance 
to choose or combine traditional mobilisation in the urban space with online platforms where they 
can engage in debates and organise collective protests. In Syria, no real anti-establishment movement 
would have been able to mobilise in the streets of Damascus or Aleppo, as the regime would have 
crushed it as it did in Hama in 1982 (George, 2003). Wiktorowicz stresses that contrary to Western 
democracies where social movement activity takes place largely through social movement 
organisations, in the Arab world this can be pursued only through dense informal networks 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004). Fear has been the most powerful weapon adopted by the Syrian regime, which 
translated into obedience, civic disengagement of people, social fragmentation and atomised 
connectivity (Wedeen, 2013).17 With the new media (satellite TV and the Internet), Syrians not only 
learnt about other realities but they engaged in communication exchanges, discussion forums, 
awareness campaigns and petitions on social matters which it would have been impossible before. 
The online platforms became the only existing space where organisation, communication and 
networking among citizens was possible. If the Asad regime had been able to impose full dominion 
in the public space, ensure full respect and discipline of its citizens in the streets, to put it in Foucault’s 
words, where space is power, this could not be replicated in the infinite space of the Internet 
(Foucault, 1998). Here ordinary people could exercise what Bayat defines as “the art of presence”, 
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citizens’ ability to circumvent constraints and discover new spaces of contestation, to confront the 
authorities, expose the state’s wrongdoings and re-appropriate the code of symbols and language that 
the regime had monopolised for long time (Bayat, 2010).18 Bayat argues that the “street” has the 
capacity of mobilising people without an active network, through the instantaneous communication 
that the public space of the street generates. The street gathers people and sentiments and thereby 
becomes the space where citizens engage in collective actions, driven by the force of necessity, the 
realisation of sharing the same grievances and of desiring the same goals, rather than articulating 
conscious political acts. Instead, the new information and communication technologies have the 
capacity to create a durable communication among atomised citizens, create a network based on a 
common identity and produce conscious public campaigns with broader adhesions.19 While the state’s 
police might occupy a street or square, breaking the solidarity and cohesion that that physical space 
had created, with the Internet, the bound among people is rarely broken by the state’s interference or 
if it happens, this only lasts for a few hours, maximum days. Both Bayat’s “streets” and the Internet 
have the advantage of also rounding up the passive networks, bystanders, meaning people not 
politically engaged and who are drawn into the contestation by the fact of simply walking-by at the 
time of the contestation, or in the case of the Internet, following online debates and campaigns.  
Syrian online mobilisation resembles more Bayat’s definition of non-movement different 
from the prevailing social movement theories formulated by Western social scientists, as the non-
movement is the collective action of non-collective actors, “ordinary people whose fragmented but 
similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an 
ideology or recognisable leaderships and organisations” (Bayat, 2010: 14). Syria’s online 
mobilisation identified with a collective and growing phenomenon of intolerance towards the state’s 
authority and request for political and social reforms, taking the form of episodic and single-target 
political and social campaigns through online platforms. Only in 2011, did this (non)movement 
became self-conscious and cohesive, organized under common objectives and coordinating public 
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acts of contestation. The online predecessor of this movement was its virtual avatar, smaller in size 
but still unifying voices under common targets and actively involved in contrasting the authorities 
through the online public spaces. The success of such (non)movement was limited by its virtual 
existence. In fact, in order for a non-movement to become a real movement – as opposed to a virtual 
one – the virtual space needs to meet the real ground, online activism needs to be coupled with offline 
activism. Accordingly for the Internet to influence political participation it must include activities that 
can be carried out both online and offline, activities that can be executed only online and activities 
that can occur only offline (Anduiza, 2009). In 2011, by spreading contention from the virtual 
peripheries to the physical space of the streets, the Syrian mobilisation acquired the full degree of 
social movement, complying with the mainstream framework of Euro-American social science 
studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper intends to explain the outbreak of the Syrian uprising of 2011 by looking at the changes 
occurring in the preceding decade. It appears that the presidency of Bashar al-Asad from 2000 to 
2011 was a period of great changes, strong pressures coming from the authorities, ordinary people 
and external powers, with contrasting forces pushing towards modernisation, conservatism and 
globalisation. Under these circumstances, the hybrid regime of Bashar al-Asad witnessed the 
development of modes of social and political action that have eluded common conceptual frames of 
social movement, for their online format that developed despite the presence of a recalcitrant 
authoritarian government.  
The online nature of the mobilisation generates some difficulties in terms of theoretical 
conceptualisation, having to collide two field of research, media and social movement studies and 
clashing with Western-centric scholarly works. Indeed, except for few exceptions, the Middle East 
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has been analysed with Euro/Western-centric normative assumptions, which have emerged from 
specific historical formations in the West and which are still assumed as teleological, universalistic 
and totalising ways of understanding the world (Matar, 2011). European studies have been framed by 
the Marxist/Hegelin tradition and notion of history, while the North American tradition adopted a 
more empirical approach, concerned with the specific conditions that facilitate or impede the rise of 
such movements. What these Western approaches have somehow failed to do is to engage with the 
rise of collective mobilisation in non-Western societies and specifically in the Arab region, at least 
till the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. Bayat aptly suggests that the main problem derives from 
assuming the Western model as the “norm” to uncritically explain non-Western contexts which have 
clearly different social composition, political institutions and thereby different dynamics of 
resistance. Ignoring the fact that the Middle East might not be compatible with the modern 
Westphalian nation-state has, on the one hand, turned a blind eye to the vast array of often 
institutionalised and hybrid social activities occurring in the region and on the other hand, produced 
a body of work that conceptualises the Middle East as, inherently, “exceptional”(Bayat 1997; Matar 
2011). This study, though deeply indebted to mainstream Euro-American political science, privileges 
alternative narratives to those that had hitherto failed to understand the changes maturing within the 
Syrian social fabric and that have been at the basis of the outbreak of its uprising. According to most 
Western sociologists, the definition of social movement applies to those movements that present an 
organised and sustained claim on the authorities; display a repertoire of performances (i.e. street 
protests, public meetings) and are represented by the presence of a (charismatic) leader (Bayat, 2010). 
This type of structure does not necessarily comply with Middle Eastern states (and often not even 
with Western cases if one considers the anti-austerity and anti-corruption movements that have 
recently developed from Europe to South-America). Social mobilisation in the Arab world seems to 
be oriented towards the attainment of economic and political rights rather than more generalised 
human rights. In Syria, the authoritarian structure of the state, the overwhelming presence of secret 
service agents ingrained in the social fabric and the fear that the regime instilled in its subjects, would 
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have not permitted the rise of any type of dissent, chiefly if represented by a leader and taking place 
in public areas (George, 2003).20 The Internet opened the way to a new type of social mobilisation, 
with a new modus operandi and a different repertoire of tactics to confront the authorities. The Syrian 
online mobilisation, whether one classifies it as a movement or non-movement, sustained claims on 
the authorities, but not as anti-establishment movement, with defined objectives, established 
strategies and ideologically driven. The repertoire of actions differed from traditional offline protests, 
and opted for online petitions or campaigns with no recognisable leaderships, as the Internet tends to 
dismantle pyramidal power structures, allowing everyone to be part of the same voice. This 
movement developed overtime, circumventing constraints and transforming the online platforms into 
spaces in which to make “oneself heard, seen, felt and realised”(Bayat, 2010). This implies that the 
analytical treatment of social movement may require a more fluid and flexible framing, one that is 
grounded in the cultural landscape, aware of the influence played by the new media technologies and 
the power dynamics exercised by all operating structures. 
What has been said hitherto on social movement theory can easily be extended to media 
studies. Scholarly work on Arab media, including some recent research, is deeply embedded in 
Western methodology of research, with a tendency to conceptualise the region with top-down analysis 
(Mellor, 2007: 42). The advent of the new information technologies has not produced any substantial 
change in the analysis, which still remains confined to Western approaches, whether for narrative or 
thematic reasons. Thematic research is mostly interested in issues of structure, censorship and 
ownership, while the narrative is ingrained in Western paradigms of analysis, which tend not to 
problematise the issue in question within the socio-political context and its agents. For instance, the 
focus of scholarly work on transnational satellite broadcasting and its impact on the construction of 
identities and politics, lingers on institutional changes (private media) and structure (talk-shows with 
call-in audiences), discarding completely the non-institutional transformation that satellite TV 
channels produce within private domains and domestic spheres. The obsession with finding the 
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“public sphere” within the new broadcasting phenomenon diverts the question to whether such 
concept can be transported to other contexts, tout court (Matar, 201: 203). Another common trait of 
the literature on Arab media studies is the tendency to flatten the subjects of their inquiry to a 
monolithic group of people. This appears when it comes to referring to the Arab people as a coherent 
and unitary group, speaking one language and sharing the same cultural background, but also when 
referring to the class of media professionals or the audience (Mellor, 2007). In Syria, journalists 
working in the private sector developed a stronger sense of responsibility and higher professionalism, 
while ordinary citizens responded positively, and enthusiastically, to this form of media, both 
becoming part of a new process of civic consciousness. As a consequence, journalism became more 
accountable and citizens more participatory, each one contributing to the development and 
empowerment of the other. This means that the effect that the new media may produce on society 
cannot be measured in terms of the number of existing satellite channels or private media outlets. It 
needs to be coupled with a more in-depth analysis of what that change produces at an individual and 
collective level.  
Similarly, studies that looked at levels of Internet penetration in Syria and to the phenomena 
of blogging and social networking have been limited in scope due to their quantitative approach and 
because of an unshakable Western bias. Studies have focused on data that quantify the number of 
web surfers, websites, Internet cafes existing in the country, rather than looking at the way the new 
technology is leveraged by its people (Wheeler, 2006). This data has proved non-objective for not 
taking into account factors such as the fact that Syrians primarily accessed the web at Internet cafes, 
or that family members logged-in using the same account. Moreover, this data does not reveal the 
most interesting aspect of the use of digital technology, meaning the effects that this technology 
produces not in terms of activism but in terms of civic engagement and human interaction offline. 
This means that the study of the Internet’s use in Syria prior to 2011 required an assessment within 
the specific local circumstances to perceive its real meaning, rather than being compared to Western 
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standards as has often been the case, where the Internet has had a longer history.21 Yet, these results 
have not been supported by studies that looked at who was using the Internet, what the content of 
online activism was and what offline connectivity was created among peers or family members once 
the laptops were switched off.  
When quantitative analysis is not supported by a qualitative and contextual study, the data 
retrieved is poor in informative content and risks (re)producing disorienting knowledge or, as is often 
the case for the MENA, labelling the region with a sort of unescapable exceptionalism. Surely, new 
media diffusion cannot be interpreted as an index to determine political and social change if the data 
perceived focuses on the hic et nunc, while ignoring the historical transformation that brought to the 
emergence of the new media. Moreover, to transform the Internet into an information weapon, as 
Howard points out, it is not necessary to have all citizens tuned online, as a networked society only 
needs a few “brokers” or “tech-savvies” to keep everyone else up to date (Howard, 2010). In Syria a 
group of brokers with high standards of IT knowledge constituted a minority, approximately 10-20% 
of the population, usually made up of professionals, students and governmental employees, that 
assumed the task of keeping an online connection between the strong, yet offline social networks (i.e. 
universities, mosques, unions, families, etc.) and the wider digital public (Della Ratta and Valeriani, 
2012). The role of these “bridge leaders” is explained by the “Two-Step Flow Theory” developed by 
sociologists Katz and Lazarsfeld (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 2006). The theory holds that a minority of 
people who have access to broader information sources, receive the information and channels it into 
the broader public. In Syria, a pocket of online dissent propagated by activists like Rami Nakhle, 
Razan Ghazzawi  Razan Zaytouneh and Rami Jarrah, became essential at the time of the uprising of 
2011, where to ensure mass participation in protests and manifestation, it was fundamental to 
homogenise the strong ties of the online social networks with the weak ties of the offline ones, turning 
to graffiti, collective revolutionary hymns and public gatherings (Brownlee, 2013). However, these 
activists played an even more important role prior to the advent of the uprising, using the Internet as 
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a medium to stir debates among citizens, stimulate critical thinking and coordinating online 
campaigns, which expressed the new power relationships establishing between citizens and authority.  
In view of what has been discussed this far, this study frames the outbreak of the Syrian 
uprising by looking at the historical formation and processes that brought to emergence a new type 
of media and at the effects this produced on the local social fabric. The aim is to place the Syrian case 
in a wider debate, which moves towards a reconceptualisation of social movement theory as an effect 
of the tremendous impact that the information and communication technologies are having on popular 
contentious politics (Carty, 2010). After all, revolutions were always aided by new technologies: the 
reformation in Europe went hand in hand with the printing press (Rubin, 2011); the revolutions of 
1848 were loosely supported by the use of the telegraph that transmitted news across Europe 
(McKeever and Rapport, 2013); the age of modern terrorism started with the invention of dynamite 
(Merriman, 2009). Today, newly emerging ICTs are redefining social relations, cultural practices, 
economic and political orders, offering perspectives of hope also for closed regimes. With a specific 
reference to the Syrian case, the new technologies allowed the counterweighting of the culture of fear 
and the offer of the possibility to new civil society agents to carry out campaigns challenging 
centralised hegemonic vision of the ruling elite in ways that traditional media would have never 
permitted. 
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19 Cfr. with Asef Bayat. 1997. Street Politics: Poor People’s Movement in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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